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1. Introduction
Modern information technologies allowing information cross-checking
coming from different administrative sources and to quickly buildup
and update inventories of bank accounts, make it relatively easy to
detect and repress shadow activity. However, this is not done and Gov-
ernments' statements of "tolerance zero" vis-a-vis the informal sector do
not seem to be taken too seriously by firms and workers who continue
to go underground. Indeed, the informal sector is flourishing: available
estimates point to an upward trend in the size of shadow economy in
OECD countries from high levels. The shadow share of GDP ranges
from a low 10 percent of GDP in the Nordics, UK, and Switzerland to
peaks of 20 to 30 percent in Southern Europe and Ireland and 40 percent
in transitional economies of Eastern Europe and Asia.
Why is the informal sector so tolerated? How do borders between
shadow employment, legal employment, and unemployment evolve
under different macroeconomic conditions and institutional configura-
tions? What does the reduction of the shadow sector imply in terms of
labor productivity?
In this paper we address these issues theoretically and empirically,
and we offer a simple explanation of the "shadow puzzle": shadow
employment and unemployment are two faces of the same coin. Shadow
employment is indeed correlated with unemployment. Based on macro,
regional as well as microdata in Italy and Brazil we find clear evidence
for this claim. Following this result, we argue that shadow employment
is tolerated because its repression increases unemployment, with unde-
sirable political consequences.
Our theory endogenizes the choice of both, workers and firms, to go
idle in an equilibrium model of the labor market with market frictions.126 Boeri & Garibaldi
From the labor demand side, firms optimally create legal or shadow
employment through a mechanism that is akin to tax evasion. Being
shadow means not paying taxes (including social security contribu-
tions) and not being liable to severance pay in case of a breakup of the
employment relationship. However, there is a positive probability that
irregular employment is detected, in which case the match is imme-
diately dissolved. From the labor supply side, heterogeneous workers
sort across the two sectors, with high productivity workers entering
the legal sector. Such worker sorting appears fully consistent with most
empirical evidence on shadow employment.
Repressing shadow employment, that is, increasing the detection
probability, means increasing job destruction and reducing job creation
in the shadow segment. While this repression tends to increase total
employment in the legal sector, it also increases unemployment. Avail-
able theories of the informal sector—recently reviewed by Schneider
and Enste (2000)—do not capture these trade-offs. This is because such
theories take a partial equilibrium approach, focus either on labor
demand or on labor supply, and do not consider sorting of workers
with varying productivity levels in the two pools. Another distinguish-
ing feature of our model is indeed that it self-selects workers in the two
pools endogenously, by determining the productivity threshold demar-
cating the two pools.
The model implies a positive correlation between unemployment and
shadow employment that is evident in cross country data as well as in
regional data from Brazil and Italy, two countries with large shadow
employment. To ensure that such correlation is not a statistical artifact
we use a unique Brazilian data set where unemployment and shadow
employment are two mutually exclusive states, and we find strong sup-
port for the positive correlation.
The model also implies that shadow wage gaps should be lower in
depressed labor markets. We find empirical support also for this impli-
cation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents a few empirical
regularities on shadow employment. Section 2 introduces and solves
the model, obtaining the various equilibrium configurations.. Section
3 evaluates the comparative static properties of the equilibria and pro-
vides some numerical simulations of the model. Section 4 assesses the
empirical relevance of the model, drawing on micro data from two
countries with a large shadow pool, namely Brazil and Italy. Finally,
section 5 briefly summarizes and concludes.Shadow Sorting 127
2. Shadow Facts
The consensus definition of the shadow economy is "all economic activ-
ities which contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) gross
national product, but escape detection in the official estimates of GDP"
(Feige 1989 and 1994; Lubell 1991; and Schneider 1994). This definition
encompasses not only legal, but also illegal activities, such as trade in
stolen goods, drug dealing, gambling, smuggling, etc. In this paper we
confine our attention to a subset of the shadow economy, namely to
legal activities. As is apparent from the above, our notion of shadow
employment is one of a lawful activity were it reported to tax authori-
ties and subject to work regulations. We focus on this (large) subset of
the shadow economy as our aim is to contribute to the literature on
the enforcement of labor regulations and to complement research on
tax evasion, which has so far overlooked the effects of tax evasion and
shadow employment on unemployment.
1
Unfortunately, available estimates of the shadow economy do not
disentangle legal from illegal shadow economy and rarely provide
measures of shadow employment. The methods being used to measure
the shadow economy either draw from direct inferences, that is surveys
trying to elicit involvement of respondents in unregistered activities or
estimates based on tax audits, or from indirect methods., which basi-
cally draw on the inconsistencies between different statistical sources
in order to gauge the size of the underground economy. Among the lat-
ter methods, discrepancies between national income and expenditure
statistics or between physical input (mainly electricity consumption)
indicators of economic activity and official GDP statistics or between
changes in the volumes of transactions and official GDP-GNP growth
or in terms of "excess" currency demand (basically the residuals of a
standard currency demand function), are the most frequently used. All
the above methods have pros and cons, and the wide variance of esti-
mates being provided is an indication of the limitations of these tech-
niques. With these caveats in mind, let us briefly review the evidence
on the size of the shadow economy, as also repeatedly summarized by
Schneider (2002, 2003, 2004).
There are two key findings which are confirmed by all studies of
which we are aware. The first common denominator of these "consen-
sus guesses" is a marked upward trend in the size of the shadow econ-
omy. Figure 1 reproduces the (unweighted) average "shadow share" of
GDP in all OECD countries for which estimates, based on the same128 Boeri & Garibaldi
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Figure 1
The upward trend of the shadow economy
methodology, are available for a relatively long-series. As revealed by
the dotted lines (plotting one standard deviation above and below
the unweighted cross-country average), there is no sign that this
trend has increased the cross-country dispersion in the size of the
shadow economy. The coefficient of variation of the shadow shares
actually decreased from 1989-2000 to 2002-2003 and there is not a
single country with a declining shadow share. The upward trend in
the shadow share is consistent across methods: it is found to hold
not only in estimates based on currency demand, but also on the so-
called DYMIMIC method (dynamic multiple indicators multiple
causes, Giles 1999) which estimates a set of structural equations within
which the size of the shadow economy cannot be measured directly
and then uses this predicted structural dependence in estimating the
size of the shadow economy. Also estimates of the shadow economy
in terms of headcounts point to an upward trend: Schneider (2000)
estimated that in the European area the number of persons working inShadow Sorting 129
the unofficial economy doubled within the two decades from 1978 to
1998.
The second fact is the relatively low productivity of shadow jobs doc-
umented by studies relying on micro-level data. In particular, Gonzaga
(2003), Almeida and Carneiro (2005), drawing on data on the informal
sector in Brazil, Lacko (2000), and Commander and Rodionova (2005),
focusing on transitional economies, as well as Boeri and Garibaldi
(2002) and Brandolini and D'Alessio (2002), drawing on Italian data
consistently document that workers engaged in shadow employment
have, on average, lower educational attainments than regular work-
ers and/or hold jobs requiring unskilled workers. The way in which
shadow jobs are identified in these studies may not be neutral with
respect to the productivity content of jobs in the two pools. However,
the fact that low-skilled workers (or occupations) are represented in
shadow employment is consistent across alternative measures of
shadow employment.
Figure 2 displays the distribution of employment by educational
attainment for shadow and non-shadow segments of the labor force
in Italy, according to different data sources and definitions. In particu-
lar, the top panel draws on Bank of Italy data and identifies shadow
employment by looking at self-reported social security records: shadow
employees are those who either reported to have never paid social secu-
rity contributions throughout their career (definition 1) or who report
the same number of months of contributions (definition 2) during the
same employment spell two years apart (which implies that they have
not been paying contributions in between the two interviews).
2 Clearly
definition 1 is more restrictive than definition 2. The mid-panel of
Figure 2 draws on Labor Force Survey data and identifies as shadow
employees those individuals who are employed according to interna-
tionally agreed, objective, definitions, but who define themselves as
non-employed. Finally, the bottom panel draws on data collected by
an ad-hoc Istat-Fondazione Curella survey carried out in Sicily in 1995
(Busetta and Giovannini 1998). In this context, shadow employment is
identified in the individuals reporting to hold an irregular job, where
irregular means not paying social security contributions, understating
the actual pay in order to pay lower taxes and contributions or being
altogether without a labor contract.
All data sources and measures of shadow employment suggest that
workers with lower educational attainments are over-represented in
the shadow pool.130 Boeri & Garibaldi
Shadow Employment by Educational Attainment of the Workforce

































































































Shadow employment by educational attainment of the labor force
Overall, shadow employment has mainly the characteristics of "mar-
ginal shadow employment/' that is, employment in low productivity
jobs, rather than "development shadow employment," i.e., new jobs
having the potential to become highly productive after some gestation
period. In other words, "infant industry" arguments cannot be applied
to justify tolerance vis-a-vis the informal sector. We are looking for
deeper and empirically more relevant ("development shadow employ-
ment" seems to involve a tiny fraction of unregistered employment)
explanations for the weak repression of shadow employment.Shadow Sorting 131
3. A Two Sectors Model with Sorting
3.1 Shadow Employment and Worker's Sorting
We consider an economy with a measure one of heterogenous workers
and two sectors. The worker type is indicated by x, where x refers to
labor market productivity and its value is drawn from a continuous
cumulative distribution function F with support [x . ,x 1. x is a fixed
r r
 L mm' max
J
time invariant worker characteristic, with x . > 0.
' mm
There are two sectors in the labor market: the regular sector and the
shadow sector. The gross value of production of each worker is indi-
cated with px where p is a productivity component common to all jobs
and x is an idiosyncratic component. To keep the notation simple, we
initially assume that p - 1, and we consider changes in p in the numeri-
cal simulations. In the regular sector firms pay a production tax t in
every period in which they employ a worker. In the shadow sector the
tax is evaded and there is an instantaneous monitoring rate equal to p.
Conditional on being monitored in the shadow sector, the shadow job
is destroyed. Both regular and shadow jobs are exogenously destroyed
at rate X?
Firms can freely post a vacancy in either sector. We focus on single
jobs, and each firm is made of one job. Posting a vacancy in the regular
sector costs k per period while in the shadow sector costs kb. There
is free entry of firms in both sectors and the equilibrium value of a
vacancy is driven down to zero. Job creation characterizes the labor
demand side of the model.
The labor supply is governed by the workers' sorting behavior.
Workers are endowed with a unit of time and freely decide whether it
is optimal to search and work in the shadow sector or in the legal sector.
Entering a sector is a full time activity, and workers cannot simultane-
ously work and/or search in both sectors. In the legal sector there is a
specific unemployed income (the unemployment benefits) which is not
available in the shadow sector.
Labor markets are imperfect, and there are market frictions in each
sector. We follow the main matching literature (Pissarides 2000) and
assume that the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed workers is
regulated by a matching function with constant returns to scale. Dif-
ferent matching functions exist in different sectors. In what follows we
let with v and v, the number of vacancies in both sectors, and u and u.132 Boeri & Garibaldi
the number of unemployed job seekers. The matching function in each
sector is indicated with
m'iu', v') i = g,b
with positive first derivative and negative second derivative. As in the
traditional matching models with constant returns to scale, the transi-
tion rate depends on the relative number of traders and it is indicated
with & = v'/u
1. Specifically, the transition rate for firms is indicated with
q'(O') = mtyfl^/v
1' with q'(O') < 0, while the transition rate for workers is
indicated with a"(0') = & q(0
i) with a' > 0.
Successful matches in each sector enjoy a pure economic rent, and we
let wages be the outcome of a Nash bargaining problem, with workers
getting a fraction /? of the total surplus. We assume, for simplicity, that
j5 is identical in the two sectors.
We solve the model in three steps. First we present the value func-
tions and the asset equations, and define the key equilibrium conditions.
Next, we solve the workers' sorting behavior in partial equilibrium,
taking as given job creation (the labor demand side of the model) and
the transition rate in each market. We then focus on job creation taking
worker behavior as given. Finally we discuss the general equilibrium of
the model, and we perform a set of numerical simulations.
3.2 Discussion
Before proceeding to the solution of the model, a few important
issues need to be discussed. Our theory does not deal with the opti-
mal enforcement of legal activity. Within the model, enforcement takes
place through the combination of random detection (the monitoring
rate p) and finite punishment (in the form of job destruction). The influ-
ential analysis of Becker (1968) has shown that, from the social welfare
standpoint, it is always optimal to substitute a higher fine for a lower
probability of detection, and that fines should be optimally set at their
maximum level. In such optimal enforcement setting, shadow employ-
ment would not be observed in equilibrium. While the Becker argument
is clear and convincing, we rarely observe such harsh punishment, pos-
sibly because important market imperfections reduce the size of the
optimal fine. Davidson, Martin, and Wilson (2004) have recently shown
that with capital market imperfections and/or asymmetric information,
the optimal fine lies below the maximum level. Even though we do not
explicitly take into account these features, we believe that our realis-Shadow Sorting 133
tic enforcement rule can be rationalized in such more complex models,
which are nevertheless left to further research.
The difference between legal and shadow jobs considered in the model
focuses only on tax compliance, and does not consider the possibility
that jobs in the two sectors differ along other important dimensions,
such as capital intensity, health insurance, and firm sponsored training.
In reality, workers' sorting decision probably takes into account various
job characteristics, and there is evidence that legal jobs provide more
training. We believe that it is technically possible to provide such key
extensions, without affecting the main results of the paper.
Our model considers shadow employment as a full-time activity
and does not allow workers to hold multiple jobs (i.e., a regular job
alongside a shadow job). In terms of flows, the model ignores on the job
search and direct transitions from shadow to legal employment with-
out intervening unemployment spells. Some of these features were con-
sidered by Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) in a matching model with fixed
labor supply, without any scope for worker sorting, the key feature of
this paper.
3.3 Value Functions
The value of a filled job in the legal sector with productivity x reads
rjs(x) = x- w8(x) - r +
where x is the tax rate, V
s is the value of a vacancy and r is the pure
discount rate. Jobs are destroyed at the exogenous rate X, and w (x) is
the wage rate.
Unemployment is a full time activity, and workers cannot work in
the shadow sector during an unemployment spell. The value of unem-
ployment in the legal sector for a worker of type x is
rll*(x) = b + a*(0)[W*(x) - U*(x)]
where b is the specific unemployed income (the unemployment ben-
efits), and W
g(x) is the value of the job for a type x. The value of a job in
the legal sector is
rW{x) = ws{x) + A[U*(x) - Ws(x)].
Posting vacancies in the legal sector is costly, and yields a per period




firms gets the expected value of a job. In formula, its expression reads134 Boeri & Garibaldi
rV = -kg + qs(&)[E[J(z) I z e Q] - V]
where the expectation is taken with respect to the productivity of work-
ers who search in the legal sector. The expression Q refers to the sup-
port of workers who search in the legal sector.
The value functions for jobs in the shadow sector are similarly
defined. The main differences is that in the shadow sectors firms do not
pay the production tax rand the job is monitored and destroyed at rate
p. Further, there is no specific unemployed income b. The four value
functions read
r]\x) = x- w\x) + (X + p)[V
b - J
b(x)]





b = -kb + q\d




C is the support of workers who search in the shadow sector.
Wages in each sector and in each job are the outcome of a bilateral
matching problem and workers get a fraction f3 of the total surplus so
that
[W%x) - U%x)] = p [W(x) - U\x) + f{x) -V] i = b, g.
For simplicity we have assumed that the fraction of the surplus is the
same in both sectors.
3.4 Equilibrium Conditions
There are three key equilibrium conditions.
• Free entry and job creation in the legal sector (JO), which implies
that the value of a vacancy be zero.
This equation will determine market tightness in the legal sector 6
g.
• Free entry and job creation in the shadow sector (JC
b), which implies
that the value of a vacancy be zero.
This equation will determine market tightness in the shadow sector
d
b.Shadow Sorting 135
• Workers' sorting (Sort). If we assume that workers' sorting satisfies
the reservation property, (a feature that holds in equilibrium) the labor
supply is described by the marginal worker with productivity R, where
R is the productivity level for which the worker is indifferent between
the two sectors, so that
U*(R) = U
b(R).




b(R)] = b + a
8(d
8)[W








The first condition says that the marginal worker is indifferent
between searching for a job in the legal or the shadow sector. The sec-
ond condition says that the total search costs in the legal sector are
identical to the expected value of a job. The last condition has a similar
interpretation, but refers to the shadow sector. The system determines




The model is closed by determining the stock of workers into the four
possible labor market states: unemployment and employment in each
of the two sectors. If we indicate with u' the stock of unemployed in
each sector and with ri the stock of employed, we have
u
8 + u
b + n* + n
b = 1.
Workers' sorting implies that the share of workers in the shadow sec-
tors is F(R) while the remaining 1 - F(R) workers search in the legal
sector. Employed workers in the shadow sector lose their job at rate X +
p while they find jobs at a rate a
h(6
h) so that the balance flow condition




b = (X + p)(F(R)-u
b)136 Boeri & Garibaldi
where n
b = F(R) - u
h. Unemployment and employment in the shadow
sector read respectively
u
























We are now in a position to formally define the equilibrium of the
model.
Definition 1 Equilibrium. The equilibrium is obtained by a triple R, 6
s, and
0
h and a vector of stock variables that satisfy the value functions /', W', U',
V (i - g, b), Nash Bargaining, and (1) Workers' sorting, (2) Job Creation in
the legal sector, (3) Job Creation in the shadow sector, (4) Balance flow condi-
tions.
3.6 Solving the Workers' Sorting Behavior
The surplus of a job in each sector is defined as the sum of the worker's
and firm value of being on the job, net of the respective outside? options,
so that
S'(x) = f{x) -V + W(x) - U'(x).
Using the value functions previously defined, as well as the free entry
condition (which drives the value of a vacancy down to zero), the sur-
plus of a match for a legal job with productivity x is
(r + X)S*(x) = x-t-b- a*(6*)[W*(x) - U*{x)].
Recalling that wages get a fraction {3 of the total surplus, the previous
expression readsShadow Sorting 137




In partial equilibrium, the job finding rates a' are constant, and the
surplus from the job is an increasing linear function of the match spe-
cific productivity x.
The surplus from the job can be used to obtain an expression for the
value of unemployment, whose expression is given by




g(x) = b +
Figure 3 shows the two value functions in partial equilibrium. The dif-
ferences in the two curves are driven by the intercept (which is negative
in the legal sector) and the slope. We make two key assumptions in this
respect:
• Taxation is large enough relative to unemployment benefits. We
formally assume that b(r + A) < TC@/3. This implies that the intercept of
U
g is negative in Figure 3.
• Monitoring is large enough. We formally assume that ofipfi + (r +
X)P(oc
8 - ot) > 0. This implies that the value function of II
s is steeper
than UK
From the value functions, we can get an expression for the reserva-
tion productivity. The reservation value R, if it exists, is the crossing
point of the two lines. Its formal expression, when considering a
8 and
a
b exogenous and constant is
_ [m
gp - b(r + A)](r + A+p+pcc
b)
gp
Existence in partial equilibrium requires R > 0, and the two key





Workers' sorting in partial equilibrium (with constant job finding rate)
considering implies that shadow jobs are occupied by workers with
low skills, in line with the evidence discussed in section 2 of this paper.
This is a key premise of our theoretical analysis
Remark 2 Shadow jobs are occupied by relatively low skilled workers.
There are several results in the partial equilibrium setting, and are
graphically obtained by shifts and movements of the two lines
• An increase in unemployment benefits reduces the reservation produc-
tivity R, so that more people search in the legal market. At given job
finding rates, an increase in unemployment benefits increases legal
employment. This is the standard entitlement effects of unemployment
benefits, a labor supply phenomenon that was first noted by Burdett
and Mortensen (1982) and Atkinson (1991) and recently received a lot
of attention (Boeri 2000; Fredrikson and Holmlund 2001; Garibaldi and
Wasmer 2005). Formally, it is obtained by noting that
dR
db
• An increase in taxation increases shadow employment. This is the
standard mechanism that taxation moves people away from the regu-
lar sector into the shadow employment, as noted by the work of Sch-
neider (2002) and recently by Davis and Henrekson (2004). Formally, it
is obtained by observing thatShadow Sorting 139
lh~a
gpP + (r + X)p{a
g - a
b)
• An increase in the monitoring rate reduces shadow employment. An
increase in the monitoring rate reduces the return from shadow employ-
ment and induces people to search in the legal market. Formally, this





3.7 Labor Demand and Job Creation
To solve for job creation we need to evaluate the expected value of a
job. We first focus on legal jobs. After an integration by parts, and
making use of the sharing rule, the integral in equation JO can be writ-
ten as
f
x" S(z)dF(z) = S(x
u) - S(R) + (1 - F(R))S(R) - S'(R) f *" F(z)dz
J R J R
\jl-F(z))dz
so that the job creation condition is
k\r + X + Pa
g (6
g)] V (1 - F(z))dz
q{6
g){l-p) l-F(R) + [R-r-b]. (1)





Market tightness 6' and the associated job finding rates a. depend on
the various parameters, as well as on the workers' sorting behavior.
Most parameters have a direct effect on job creation, plus an indirect
effect via the reservation productivity R. Formally, we can write140 Boeri & Garibaldi
where the symbol R() suggests that R is itself an endogenous variable.
Some important comparative static results follow.
• An increase in the reservation productivity R increases market tightness
and the job finding rates in both sectors. An increase in R increases the
average quality of the workforce in both sectors, so that firms natu-
rally respond by posting more vacancies per unemployed. This result
is important, and shows how sorting affects job creation. Formally, it is





























where the LHS is positive since q' < 0.
• An increase in unemployment benefits b, at given reservation produc-
tivity R, reduces job creation in the legal sector. This is the standard
adverse effect of unemployment income on job creation, an effect that
works mainly through the wage rule.
• An increase in taxation, at given reservation productivity R, reduces
job creation in the legal sector. This is also a textbook adverse labor
demand effect of taxation.
• An increase in the monitoring rate p, at given reservation productivity
R, reduces job creation in the shadow sector. Higher monitoring rate
acts as an increase in the destruction rate on shadow jobs.
3.8 General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the model is obtained by solving for the triple
JR, d
g, 6
h that simultaneously satisfy Sort JC
f
c and JO. One way to solve for
the general equilibrium result is to consider the workers' sorting condi-
tion by explicitly considering the relationship between the job finding
rates and the reservation productivity. This is equivalent to solvingShadow Sorting 141
a
b(R,.)PR
where the expression a
h{R, .) and a
g(R, .) are consistent with the job
creation conditions. Both sides of the expression are increasing func-
tions of R. The difference with respect to the partial equilibrium result
is that the expressions for the value of unemployment in equation (3)
are no longer simple linear function, but they are both increasing func-
tions of R. To understand this, consider the effects of an increase in R
on the value of unemployment in both sectors; there are two effects at
work.
• First, there is a positive surplus effect. This is analogous to the effect
analyzed in partial equilibrium. An increase in R increases the value
of unemployment in both sectors, but has a larger effect on the legal
sector in light of the difference in the slope and the presence of p in the
shadow sector.
• Second, there is a job creation effect. An increase in R increases the job
finding rate in both sectors, since the average value of the workforce
increases.
As both effects reinforce each other in a non-linear fashion, multiple
equilibria cannot be ruled out ex-ante. This should not be surprising,
since multiple equilibria in matching models with double heterogene-
ity are a standard feature (Albrecht and Vroman 2002).
Remark 3 Multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out, and depend on the distri-
bution of productivity.
Since both sides are increasing and non-linear functions of R, there is
no guarantee that the equilibrium is unique.
In the simulations that follow, where we use a distribution for the
productivity x that is negative exponential, there is a unique equilib-
rium. In any case, if there were two equilibria, there would be different
implications for the distribution of skills across the two sectors, with a
perverse equilibrium that implies that high productivity workers enter
the shadow sector. In Figure 4, the equilibrium of point A is consistent
with the skilled distribution that we highlighted in the comparative
static section. The feature of such an equilibrium can be described as












where the second condition ensures that the value function of the legal
sector is the steepest one in the equilibrium point.
4. Simulations and Comparative Static
The comparative static results in the general equilibrium are not
straightforward, since they combine the effect of each parameter on the
labor demand and the labor supply of the model.
Consider the effects of taxation. An increase in taxes tend to push
jobs into the shadow sector, and to decrease the value of each job. This
is a standard result that reduces job creation. Yet, the resulting increase
in R improves the average quality of the workforce in the legal sector,
with a positive effect on job creation. As a result, the total effect on job
creation may be ambiguous.
Consider an increase in the monitoring rate. On the one hand, it
reduces R from the labor supply standpoint and reduces job creation in
the shadow sector. Both effects reinforce each other, and tend to reduce
R. On the other hand, the reduction in R, by increasing the average pro-
ductivity of workers in the legal sector, feeds back on job creation in the
legal sector, and tends to reduce R. This suggests that an increase in the
monitoring rate can reduce job creation in the good sector.Shadow Sorting 143
Similar logical arguments follow for the other comparative static
exercise. The increase in unemployment benefits reduces (in partial
equilibrium) the number of people in the shadow sector by reducing
R. The fall in R induces a feed back effect on the average quality of the
workforce in the legal sector and, from the labor demand side, a reduc-
tion in job creation.
4.1 Baseline Specification
The baseline specification of the model is described in Table 1. With
respect to the model presented in the equations, the empirical specifica-
tion of the productivity is px, where x is the idiosyncratic component

















































































0.12144 Boeri & Garibaldi
to a production tax x, the simulations consider also a firing tax T, to be
paid only in the legal sector conditionally on a job separation (when the
shock X strikes).
The distribution is negative exponential. Figure 5 reports the differ-
ence between U
g(R) - U
b(R) for different values of the reservation pro-
ductivity. The general equilibrium is described by the crossing of such
difference with the zero line. The figure clearly shows that there is a
single crossing and that the equilibrium is unique. The baseline param-
eterization is described and reported in Table 1. Most parameters are
standard in the literature (notably a 0.5 value for the bargaining share
and the matching elasticity). The search costs correspond to 25 percent
of the value of the labor product, a value that is roughly consistent with
the structural estimates provided by Yashiv (2000).
The shadow rate, defined as the ratio between employment in the
shadow sector and total employment (including both n
g and n
b at the
denominator) is around 14 percent. We perform various comparative
static exercises.
4.2 Changes in Aggregate Conditions
We study the effects of the increase in p on the general equilibrium of
the model. The results are reported in Table 2. With the exception of p,
all the other parameters are identical to those of Table 1.
An increase in aggregate productivity increases employment and
reduces unemployment in the legal sector. Further, it reduces employ-
ment in the shadow sector. This is one of the key macroeconomic results
of the paper. Unemployment and shadow employment are positively
correlated across different states of the macroeconomy.
Remark 4 Unemployment and shadow employment are two faces of the same
coin. Worse aggregate conditions induce an increase in both unemployment
and shadow employment (as well as its shadow rate).
The logic of this result can be expressed as follows. The increase in p
tends to increase job creation and market tightness. Simultaneously, the
increase in p induces a fall in the marginal productivity R, so that aver-
age quality worsens in both sectors. This tends to reduce job creation.
The second effect appears to be quantitatively more important in the
















General equilibrium with exponential distribution
Table 2 shows that wage differentials between the legal and the
shadow sector (the shadow wage gap) are quantitatively more impor-
tant when aggregate business conditions are good.
Remark 5 Wage differentials should be larger in less depressed regions.
There are two adjustment mechanisms behind this result. First,
a larger p directly affects match productivity inducing an increase
in wages per any given x. Second, the rise in aggregate productivity
involves a reduction of the productivity threshold so that the average
quality of matches in both sectors decline. This tends to depress aver-
age wages in both sectors. As the aggregate shock is multiplicative, its
direct (positive) effects on wages are quantitatively more important in
the legal sector than in the shadow sector, whilst the indirect effects are
nearly symmetric due to the common threshold, R.
43 Changes in Taxation and Regulations
We study the effects of the increase in r on the general equilibrium of
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are identical to those of Table 1. More taxes and regulations (see Table 4)
increase shadow employment and reduce legal employment. This is the
standard result of Schneider (2002). It is also consistent with the work
of Davis and Henrekson (2005).
The effect of taxation on unemployment is quantitatively very mod-
est, since there are two countervailing effects at work. There is the
indirect effect on job creation via the increase in the reservation pro-
ductivity (reducing unemployment) plus the direct effect of taxes on
market tightness in the legal sector (increasing unemployment).
Changes in regulation (through the firing tax) are qualitatively analo-
gous to the effects of taxation.
4.4 Changes in the Monitoring Rate
We study the effects of the increase in p on the general equilibrium of
the model. The results are reported in Table 5. An increase in monitor-
ing intensity reduces the shadow rate, but it increases unemployment.
We view this result as extremely important, since it highlights one
of the key reasons why governments may be reluctant to repress the
shadow sector. The associated increase in unemployment is politically
costly and thus avoided by utility maximizing politicians.
4.5 Changes in Unemployed Income
We now consider the effects of an increase in b (see Table 6). An increase
in unemployed income reduces the shadow rate, and increases unem-
ployment. Yet, the increase in participation in the legal sector increases
legal employment and reduces shadow employment. Note that market
tightness falls in both sectors.
The increase in unemployed income can be considered as a policy for
uncovering (as opposed to repressing) shadow activities. Various dif-
ficulties are likely to exist in reality in enforcing this policy (unemploy-
ment income requires larger taxation and very good monitoring). Yet,
it can be quite effective.
5. Empirical Relevance
Our model implies: (1) a positive cross-sectional and time-series cor-
relation between the size of the shadow sector and unemployment (the
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wage gap" that is larger in countries-regions and years in which unem-
ployment is lower, (3) a shadow employment that is increasing in
taxation and labor market regulations, and (4) that tighter monitoring
increases unemployment. From a political economy perspective, the
latter result implies a lax enforcement of regulations in high-unemploy-
ment regions.
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the empirical relevance of
(1), (2) and (4). Implication (3) is common to other models of the shadow
economy and holds in many cross-sectional studies, as reviewed by
Schneider (2002).
5.1 Two Faces of the Same Coin?
Figure 6 documents the correlation between the size of the shadow
economy and the non-employment rate across countries and Figure 7
across Italian regions, in both cases over average period data. In partic-
ular, Figure 6 displays, on the vertical axis, the cross-country compara-
ble estimates of the shadow economy over GDP provided by Schneider
(2004) and, on the horizontal axis, non-employment rates (unemployed
and inactive as a fraction of the working age population) obtained from
harmonized Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. Regional non-employ-
ment rates are also obtained from the (Italian) LFS, while the regional
estimates of shadow employment are drawn from Istat. The latter are
provided in terms of full-time equivalents (ULA, "unita di lavoro equiv-
alenti") and are estimated building on the difference between survey-
based employment and employment levels, as computed on the basis
of administrative (social security records) as well as estimates of illegal
employment of foreign workers.
4
The correlation is striking in both cases: the cross-country correlation
is .7 with a t-statistic of 4.76; the cross-regional correlation is .94 with
a t-statistic of 11.79. It holds also when shadow employment is broken
down by broad sectors, e.g., it is not a byproduct of the specialization
of Southern regions in sectors (e.g., agriculture) where shadow employ-
ment is larger. There is also no tendency over time to a reduction in
regional differentials in shadow rates: they were in 1995 roughly as
large as ten years earlier.
Unfortunately, there are no long series of shadow employment and
unemployment from which to assess their pairwise correlation over
time. Figure 8 hints at comovements between the shadow rate and
unemployment in Italy. The shadow rate initially rose with unemploy-
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Figure 8
Unemployment and shadow employment over time in Italy
All these correlations are consistent with the implications of our model
and can be rationalized by the fact that positive macroeconomic shocks
or greater efficiency in a region increases job creation and reduces the
reservation productivity level at which jobs turn into formal jobs. How-
ever, given the size and statistical significance of correlations, one may
think that they are a mere statistical artifact, related to the way in which
the two measures are defined. As discussed in the Annex, a spurious
correlation may be induced between shadow employment and the
unemployment rate, when shadow employment is wrongly classified
as unemployment by Labor Force Statistics. The large unemployment
rates observed also among prime-age men in Southern Italian regions
suggest that LFS data may indeed mis-classify jobs in the shadow sec-
tor. Unfortunately, estimates of the shadow economy generally come
from statistical sources which are silent on labor market aggregates.
When LFS data are used to measure shadow employment (e.g., as done
in Table 2), they either just scrap the surface of the phenomenon (the
number are too small to achieve regional representation) or concentrate
only on the subset of shadow employment which is not mis-classified
by LFS statistics. Hence, there is no way to map shadow employment
into the different LFS aggregates.Shadow Sorting 155
An important exception is the PME (Monthly Employment) survey
carried out in six Brazilian metropolitan areas since 1982. The survey
design is similar to the CPS in the U.S. and includes a question on
the payment of social security contributions. Following Almeida and
Carneiro (2005) and Gonzaga (2003), we identify shadow workers as
those individuals reporting to work but stating that they do not have
a social security card. It is a relatively large component of the labor
force: the shadow rate can be as high as roughly one-third. By construc-
tion, these shadow workers cannot be classified as unemployed. Figure
9 displays the yearly shadow and unemployment rates in six Brazilian
metropolitan areas since the inception of the survey. There is a remark-
able positive correlation (ranging from .31 in Rio to .82 in Salvador
with t-statistics in the range 3.4 to 6.1). This correlation cannot be a
statistical artifact, and provides genuine evidence of our empirical
implications.
5.2 The Shadow Wage Gap
Our model predicts that improvements in aggregate conditions increase
the shadow wage gap.
Six Brazilian cities (1982-2002)
Belo Horizonte Porto Alegre Recife
* *
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Figure 10 displays the shadow wage gap and a simple Oaxaca decom-
position of this gap in Italy over time and across two macro-regions
characterized by very different aggregate conditions, such as the North
and the Mezzogiorno. In particular, drawing on the Bank of Italy SHIW
we run two standard wage regressions for the legal and the shadow











where X' denotes average "personal-demographic" characteristics
(educational attainments, gender, age, family status, etc.) of sector "i"
and P' the returns to these characteristics. Then we can decompose the
shadow wage gap as the sum of a difference in quantities (explained












An advantage of this decomposition is that it isolates the component
which drives the changes in the shadow wage gap according to our
model: it is the unexplained (or difference in returns) component, that
is, the second term in equation (4). The decomposition is akin to the
partial equilibrium comparative static exercise above, in that it assumes
that differences in returns are uncorrelated with changes in the char-
acteristics of the two pools. It should be interpreted as an approxima-
tion of the first-round effects of changes in the aggregate shock. Our
Oaxaca Decomposition of the Shadow Wage Gap




























Notes: Controls include age,gender,family status and educational attainments
Source: Bank of Italy SHIW various years
Figure 10
Oaxaca decomposition of the shadow wage gapShadow Sorting 157
exercise suggests that the shadow gap has been widening since 1998, at
times in which unemployment was declining, and that it is larger in the
dynamic North than in the depressed Southern labor markets. The key
factor behind these differences is the unexplained (returns) component
of the gap.
5.3 Enforcement
Modern information technologies allow tax administrations to eas-
ily collect and cross-check information from a variety of sources. For
instance, the Spanish tax administration built-up an inventory of bank
accounts which is particularly useful in tracking the shadow sector. The
Italian "Agenzie delle Entrate" is developing an inventory of electric-
ity, gas, telephone, and water bills of contributors, which can be readily
cross-checked with tax records.
There are plenty of anecdotes about poor enforcement in high-unem-
ployment regions, although it is very hard to document this. There are
documents of the Italian Agenzia delle Entrate stating that enforce-
ment should be milder in small units and in agriculture, where shadow
employment is over-represented. Almeida and Carneiro (2005) report
a negative correlation between unemployment and worksite inspec-
tions in Brazil. Broadly similar is the conclusions of the Osservatorio
Veneto, although shadow employment in Veneto is very much related
to immigration. A negative relationship between shadow employment
and monitoring is driven in our model by the effects of controls on job
creation in the shadow sector. But there can also be political economy
arguments for observing less repression of the shadow sector in high
unemployment regions.
6. Final Remarks
An equilibrium search model of the labor market, with workers' sort-
ing, attempts to explain the "shadow puzzle," the increasing size of
the shadow economy in OECD countries in spite of improvements in
technologies detecting tax and social security evasion. Our model has
implications which are broadly supported by the, admittedly scant, evi-
dence on shadow labor markets. In particular, we consistently find a
positive cross-sectional and time-series correlation between the shadow
rate and unemployment, and this correlation cannot be attributed to a
statistical artifact.158 Boeri & Garibaldi
Our model delivers also some policy implications. The most impor-
tant is quite simple: in order to reduce shadow employment, it is necessary
to deregulate the labor market. Deregulation reduces unemployment, and
shadow employment is reduced as a by-product. In this context, the model
confirms the traditional wisdom on labor market reforms, and suggests
that any policy that fosters job creation and enhances aggregate pro-
ductivity will induce a reduction in shadow employment. What about
specific policies, aimed at discouraging the emergence of shadow activ-
ity? Our simple theory suggests that a very cautious approach in this
area is warranted, since an increase in the monitoring rate may backfire:
in equilibrium, higher monitoring reduces job creation, and increase
unemployment. Tight enforcement of entitlement rules to unemploy-
ment benefits can be a better option acting on the supply side (when
unemployment benefits are collected only by workers with a regular
employment history, and cannot be cumulated to income from shadow
jobs, the workers' incentive to enter the shadow sector are reduced) and
hence has better job creation properties.
In further work we plan to investigate combinations of shadow and
regular jobs, both in labor demand and supply. Although this extension
will significantly increase the complexity of our model, we are aware
that the choice to go shadow is not merely a dichotomic choice. Multi-
ple job holding allows workers, for instance, to allocate hours across the
two sectors. And firms can react to idiosyncratic productivity shocks by
crossing borders between shadow and regular jobs.
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Notes
1. See Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2000) for an analysis of the relationship between crime
and unemployment.
2. Clearly this second definition requires exploiting the longitudinal features of the Bank
of Italy Survey. For a description see Boeri and Brandolini (2004).Shadow Sorting 159
3. In the simulations we also assume that conditional on striking, regular jobs need to
pay a firing tax T.
4. See Calzaroni and Pascarella (1998) for details on the estimates of shadow employ-
ment in Italian macro-regions.
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Annex
A Statistical Artifact?
According to the labor force statistics, the working age population is classified
as E
lf, W, and Nowhere the values refer respectively to labor force employment,
unemployment, and out of the labor force. If the labor force is indicated with
wap the function reads
W + N'f = wap.
The unemployment rate is than defined as
The official istat definition of the shadow rate, s, is given by the estimate of
shadow employment (lavoro irregolare) over the sum of regular employment
E







The key issue concerns the relationship between E
s and £
;/or whether shadow
employment is part of the labor force employment. The answer depends on
various assumptions regarding the position of shadow employment in the
labor force statistics.
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In other words, an increase in shadow employment E
s leads to an increase in
the shadow rate and to a decrease in the unemployment rate. The empirical
correlation, in this case is not a statistical artifact.
Remark 6 If shadow employment is part of labor force employment, the correlation
between s and u is not a statistical artifact.
Assumption 2: Shadow employment is within the out of the labor force measured in





where N is a pure measure of out of the labor force (not observed in labor force
statistics).
Therefore






In other words, an increase in shadow employment leads to an increase in the
shadow rate and has no impact on the unemployment rate. Also in this case, the
empirical correlation is not a statistical artifact.
Remark 7 If shadow employment is part of out of the labor force in labor force surveys,
the correlation between s and u is not a statistical artifact.
Assumption 3: Shadow employment is within unemployment measured in labor force
surveys.Shadow Sorting 163
This implies that
where U is a pure unemployment rate while E
s is shadow employment. In this






from which it follows that
JF
>0-
Remark 8 If shadow employment is part of labor force unemployment, the correlation
between s and u is a statistical artifact.
In this latter scenario one should try to correct the official unemployment sta-
tistics. Is there a fraction of unemployed people that looks suspicious? Unfor-
tunately there is no mapping from estimates of shadow employment to LFS
definitions of employment, unemployment and inactivity. In order to devise
some method to track the labor market status of shadow employment we need to
introduce some identifying restrictions. This requires some theoretical guidance.